Venezuala and Colombia: the odd couple?

On 28 November 2011, another of Colombia's most wanted, Maximiliano Bonilla-Orozco, AKA Valenciano, was captured across the border in Venezuela. He will shortly be handed over to the Colombian authorities and will likely be extradited to the US. Since the extradition of Oficina de Envigado's Don Berna to the US in 2008, Valenciano has been competing with former associateErick Vargas Cardenas, AKA Sebastian, for control of the Berna legacy in Medellin. Firsthand reports in 2011 have evidenced an upsurge in violence in the City that is directly attributable to the struggle for power that has ensued between the two narcos.

President Santos described Valenciano’s arrest as a ‘good present’ for Colombia, and it is another high-profile scalp for the security forces. This time it had the added plus of cross-border collaboration that has not been a feature of the Colombia-Venezuela relationship in recent years. A new trade agreement between the two neighbours that was announced the same week has led some commentators to predict the coming of a new dawn at the top of the Andes. However, seasoned local observers on the ground in Colombia paint a different picture. To them, without exception, Chavez continues to represent an unpredictable, divisive figure in the region, with a brand of ultra-populism that remains diametrically opposed to the more Market-led reforms that Colombia is implementing

• At the level of international relations, Colombia is making successful strides to cement trade agreements with Europe and the US and create a level of monetary and fiscal discipline. These helped push it to the fourth most popular destination for foreign FDI inflows to the continent in 2010 with just over 15bn of investment;

• Meanwhile, its Bolivarian neighbour repatriates gold from foreign States, sells oil to Iran at favourable rates, and publicly supported Mohammar Ghadaffi during the recent conflict in Libya. It is also running a de facto parallel currency;

• The border with Venezuela remains one of, if not the most insecure region in Colombia. It is rumoured that numerous FARC members are hiding inside Venezuela while Chavez seems to be doing little, in practical terms, to address the issue. FARC's new leader Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry, AKA Timochenko, was in fact believed to have been based there, at least until recently when assumed the role of the insurgents’ leader following Alfonso Cano's death earlier this month;

• Taking the above into account, would it be unreasonable to ask whether Chavez had in fact been aware of, or at least wilfully blind to, Valenciano's whereabouts in Venezuela all along?

Undeniably, the bilateral relationship has improved since the change in Colombia from Uribe to Santos. However, due to significant ongoing ideological differences between the two leaders, cross-border security issues, and the significant potential for disagreement in the fields of international trade and investment, the relationship will continue to be a complex one for some years to come. Like a deeply dysfunctional married couple, Colombia and Venezuela are stuck with each other. There may be thaw in the air right now, but their chalk and cheese elements still remain.

Does the death of Alfonso Cano signal the end of the road for FARC? Written with, and published by Pionero Partners with James Knight, 7.11.2011

After the successful military operation that resulted in the death of the FARC leader, President Juan Manuel Santos has publicly threatened the group's remaining members with three stark choices - demobilise, go to prison, or be killed.

The removal of the leader of Colombia's oldest and largest guerilla movement is an important strategic successes, and scores a significant blow to rebel morale. However, it may not ultimately lead to the group's end, as widely predicted by many analysts and media outlets. Why?:

1) FARC has suffered similar losses in the past, and continued to function effectively. Most recently, the death of Mono Jojoy in September 2010 during a military operation by the government. Jojoy was FARC's strategic mastermind and leader of its Eastern Bloc. Many commentators at the time suggested that Jojoy's death would be a game-changing loss for the organisation,but they were proved wrong as the group continued, and even increased its military activities, during early and mid 2011.

2) Today FARC plays a far more important role as a criminal syndicate than it does an agent for political change. As witnessed with the Mexican government's Kingpin strategy, numerous successes in either killing or arresting leaders of criminal groups have not ultimately led to their demise. Criminal gangs' complex financial and hierarchical networks, and economic motivation, now mean that the killing of one man alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to bring down an entire organisation.

3) In Colombia in recent years FARC have developed extensive and lucrative financial ties, based around drug trafficking and relarionships with neo-paramilitary organisations and other gangs, both in and outside the country. They have also become increasingly involved in other money making ventures such as kidnapping. Such ties and illicit activities have arguably entirely replaced the politically-driven ideology that first gave birth to the organisation. The financial rewards of these relationships are simply too significant to turn their back on.

Therefore, we predict that while FARC's military capability continues to dwindle, a new leader will rise to fill the void left by Cano, and the disruptive activities in certain pockets of the country that put such a strain on local communities and the Colombian economy (in the form of its inflated defence spending) will continue.